A common question that follows, however, is what exactly does “best” mean in the context of possible worlds. Leibniz argued that the best of all possible worlds is one that permits a maximization of being. God weighs all the possibilities to estimate their degree of perfection or imperfection. The result of these infinite comparisons is the choice of the best world (e.g. this world). Leibniz justifies his position by arguing that God is bound by His nature to create His best. Steinberg points out that this argument hinges on the premise that God is bound by a principle of perfection to always do His best wherever He acts. God’s decision to do His best emanates from His nature, in that it is not logically possible for God to do any less than He is. It is not that this world is the best because it bears the most similarities or congruence with the divine perfection (a Thomist notion), but rather is the best because in its totality this world cannot be improved upon.
For Little, “best” pertains to that which has the highest possible moral order under the circumstance. In this sense “best” represents not a quantitative, but a qualitative notion. Similar to Leibniz’s premise of best as “that which cannot be improved upon,” Little argues that this world is the best because it contains the optimal relationship possible between good and evil. Hick also understands “best” to represent that which best serves the purpose that God is seeking to accomplish.
These proposed definitions of “best” stand on the premise that creation embodies an intrinsic goodness, which emanates from the Creator Himself. Therefore, in order to properly define “best” one must investigate what exactly the intrinsic goodness of Creation entails. Since that goodness flows directly from God, one must ascertain what the goodness of God really is. It is this goodness of God, which informed Him in Creation, which demonstrates that this is the best of all possible worlds.
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